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RESPONDING TO BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS 
BY BARRY KELLMAN* 
 
In 2001, powdered anthrax in envelopes disrupted the government, cost billions to clean 
up, and killed five people.1 Terrorist groups such as Aum Shunriky, which released sarin gas in 
the Tokyo subway experimented with biological weapons. 2Al Qaida built an anthrax lab in 
Afghanistan in the 1990s. 3 Experts are concerned that future bio-attacks could lead to dire 
consequences substantially exceeding anything other than  nuclear weapons – hundreds of 
thousands of casualties, trillions of dollars in losses, and exceptional levels of panic.4 In 2008, the 
Commission on Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism asserted 
that bio-attacks are the most likely catastrophic threat to humanity.5 
How should the government be ready to respond to a catastrophic bio-attack that no one 
knows when, where, or even whether it will occur? It is useful to break down this question into 
three principle components. First, how can responders quickly and accurately know what agent 
has been used so that they can respond? Second, how can responders obtain sufficient medication 
to treat affected populations against whichever agent that has been used? Third, how can 
responders effectively limit the damage and restore order?   Dozens of U.S. government agencies 
and programs have relevant and often overlapping responsibilities without centralized oversight 
– a bureaucratic condition that makes it difficult for people inside and outside government to 
understand what is exactly going on.6    
 
 
                                                 
∗  Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. 
1 Kimberly M. Thompson et al., Bayes, Bugs, and Bioterrorists: Lessons Learned from the Anthrax Attacks, 
CTR. TECH. & NAT’L SEC. POL’Y NAT’L DEF. U. (Apr. 2005), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a435051.pdf. 
2 Holly Fletcher, Aum Shinrikyo, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 2012), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/aum-shinrikyo.  
3 Michael R. Gordon, A Nation Challenged: Weapons; US Says it Found Qaeda Lab Being Built to Produce 
Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/23/world/nation-challenged-weapons-us-
says-it-found-qaeda-lab-being-built-produce-anthrax.html. 
4 Ben Farmer, Bioterrorism Could Kill More People than Nuclear War, Bill Gates to Warn World Leaders, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/17/biological-terrorism-could-
kill-people-nuclear-attacks-bill/.  
5 Graham Allison et al., World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation 
and Terrorism, COMM’N ON PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PROLIFERATION & TERRORISM 
(Dec. 2008), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a510559.pdf.  
6 Controlling the Bureaucracy, LUMEN LEARNING, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/amgovernment/chapter/ 
controlling-the-bureaucracy/ (last visited June 5, 2019). 
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I. Detection and Diagnosis 
 Each specific bio-agent demands a unique response. Properly responding to an anthrax 
attack, for instance, is very different than responding to a smallpox or plague attack.7 Moreover, 
decisions must be made quickly to stanch a pandemic’s spread. Being able to accurately and 
quickly detect and diagnose a bio-attack depends on having sophisticated capacities in place to 
gather, transmit, and analyze health and environmental data.      
Detection 
The earlier that a bio-attack is detected, the better. Yet, unlike an explosion or other 
conventional attack, a bio-attack will not be immediately obvious until disease symptoms are 
overwhelming. Even then, there will likely be confusion about which disease is causing those 
symptoms.  The challenge, therefore, is obtaining accurate data quickly enough to mobilize an 
effective response.  
1. BioWatch for Sensing Pathogens  
 Experts believe that bio-attack agents will likely be released in the air within highly 
trafficked indoor sites such as arenas, airports, and subway stations.8 Programs managed by the 
Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services are responsible for detection 
of a bio-attack.9 To detect unusual releases, the DHS Office of Health Affairs BioWatch program 
places biosensors in major American cities that are connected to a national 24/7 early warning 
system.10 Although DHS has not confirmed the exact number of cities engaged in the BioWatch 
program or the exact location of sensors, at least 31 cities are included in the BioWatch program, 
including Philadelphia, New York City, Washington, San Diego, Boston, Chicago, Miami, Atlanta, 
Detroit, Denver, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, Houston and Los Angeles, with a goal of 
expanding to as many as 120 cities.11   
The sensors test for anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia, and perhaps other agents, 
although the exact list is undisclosed.12 Despite the biosensors, testing for bio-agents in the air is 
                                                 
7 Mark Keim & Arnold F. Kauffmann, Principles for Emergency Response to Bioterrorism, 34 ANNALS OF 
EMER. MED. 177, 181 (1999).  
8 Brian Naylor, U.S. Bioterrorism-Detection Program is Unreliable, Report Finds, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 
23, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/11/23/457101931/u-s-bioterrorism-detection-
program-is-unreliable-report-finds. 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Detecting Bioterrorist Attacks, https://www.dhs.gov/biowatch-program (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2019).  
10 Id.; See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DHS’ Management of BioWatch 
Program (Jan. 2007), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-22_Jan07.pdf.  
11 DANA A. SHEA & SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL312152, THE BIOWATCH PROGRAM: 
DETECTION OF BIOTERRORISM (2003). 
12 Id. 
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extremely difficult.13 A sensor that is too specific might neglect a dangerous release.14 A sensor 
that is too broad, on the other hand, it might falsely react to something natural and benign.15 DHS 
officials, therefore, are continuously trying to improve sensor capabilities.16   
2. Programs for Reporting Unusual Diseases 
Other than sensing pathogens, a bio-attack can be detected through reports of unusual 
disease outbreaks.17 By accumulating reports of often-disparate symptoms, public health officials 
can identify a pattern that might suggest an epidemic.18 Biosurveillance refers to a continuous 
process for monitoring the environment for markers of disease.19 The key to biosurveillance is the 
systematic collection and analysis of data that can usefully characterize an event, as well as support 
an outbreak investigation.20 The 2009 swine flu outbreak, for example, was initially signaled by a 
sudden increase in worker and student absenteeism in Veracruz, Mexico, along with elevated 
purchases of over-the-counter flu remedies.21 In 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act required the 
development of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (“NBIC”) to identify, 
characterize, localize and track biological events. 22  The Health Incident Surveillance Branch 
within the Health Threats Resilience Division of the DHS-OHA supervises the NBIC in 
coordination with 14 federal agencies.23 
 The BioSense program is another important component of biosurveillance. BioSense was 
initiated in 2003 as an integrated public health surveillance program managed by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).24 Patient-anonymous data is collected from electronic 
                                                 
13 Kim E. Sapsford et al., Sensors for Detecting Biological Agents, 11 MATERIALSTODAY 38, 43 (2008). 
14 COMM. ON MAT’L & MFG. PROCESSES FOR ADVANCED SENSORS & RES. COUNCIL, NATIONAL SENSOR 
SYSTEMS FOR BIOLOGICAL AGENT ATTACKS: PROTECTING BUILDINGS AND MILITARY BASES, 6 (2005) 
(ebook).  
15 Id. 
16 Supra note 14 at 1. 
17 Stanley M. Lemon et al., Global Infectious Disease Surveillance and Detection: Assessing the Challenges – 
Finding Solutions Workshop Summary, INST. OF MED. OF NAT’L ACAD.S’ 2,     
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11996/global-infectious-disease-surveillance-and-detection-assessing-the 
challenges-(last visited May 29, 2019).  
18 Marc Lipsitch et al., Improving the Evidence Base for Decision Making During a Pandemic: The Example of  
2009 Influenza A/H1N1, 9 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 89, 95 
(2011). 
19 Nicholas Kman & Daniel Bachmann, Biosurveillance: A Review and Update, 2012 ADVANCES IN 
PREVENTATIVE MED., 2012, at 1.  
20 Id. 
21 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., In New Theory, Swine Flu Started in Asia, not Mexico, N.Y. TIMES,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/health/24flu.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2019). 
22 6 U.S.C. § 195b(a) (2017). 
23 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., National Biosurveillance Integration Center, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2015-Factsheet-NBIC_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
24 National Syndromic Surveillance Program, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nssp/documents/NSSP-fact-sheet-508.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
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health record systems, school absentee data, pharmacy data, food-borne outbreaks and other 
information sources for syndromic analysis.25 State and local public health authorities have access 
to this secure data to aid in analysis; public health authorities may now designate BioSense for 
receiving syndromic surveillance test messages.26   
The CDC, in turn, promotes disease reporting through the Public Health Information 
Network (“PHIN”), a network of information systems that optimizes electronic disease reporting 
with a common lexicon and technical requirements, and by promulgating an overall health 
information exchange architecture.27 The National Electronic Disease Surveillance System is an 
Internet-based exchange architecture designed to enhance the PHIN by transferring appropriate 
public health, laboratory and clinical data efficiently and securely over the Internet to public health 
departments. 28 Notably, increased resources are being devoted to standards-based electronic 
messaging between stakeholders at multiple levels (providers, labs, local and state public health 
and CDC). 29    
The CDC's BioIntelligence Center (“BIC”) provides situational awareness of potential 
threats to local and state governments.30 BIC analysts examine health data regarding 11 outbreak 
syndromes such as fever, rash, and gastrointestinal distress in order to detect unusual 
concentrations that might indicate a significant threat to public health.31 When appropriate, the 
CDC director's Emergency Operations Center monitors the situation and coordinates data and 
analysis with the BIC. 32 The CDC also works to identify outbreaks with local and international 
                                                 
25 Deborah W. Gould et al., The Evolution of BioSense: Lessons Learned and Future Directions, PUB. HEALTH 
REP.S’, https://doi.org/10.1177/0033354917706954 (last visited June 6, 2019). 
26 Maximilian Wegener, BioSense 2.0 Training Course Handbook, NEV. OFF. OF PUB. HEALTH INFO. & 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 2, 4, 19 (Apr. 2015),  
http://dpbh.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dpbh.nv.gov/content/Programs/BioSense/dta/Training/Handbook%20for%20
the%20BioSense2.0%20Training%20Course.pdf.  
27 CTR.S’ FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PHIN Tools and Resources, 
https://www.cdc.gov/phin/index.html (last visited May 8, 2019). 
28 National Electronic Disease Surveillance System: A Status Report on Implementation, COUNCIL OF ST. &  
TERR. EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, http://www.cste2.org/webpdfs/NEDSSassessmentCSTE2008.pdf (last visited Jan.17,   
2019).   
29 Id.  
30 Colleen A. Bradley et al., BioSense: Implementation of a National Early Event Detection and Situational 
Awareness System, CTR.S’ FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 26, 2005), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16177687. 
31 Daniel Neill & Karl Soetebier, International Society for Disease Surveillance Conference 2011: Building a 
Future of Public Health Surveillance, EMERGING HEALTH THREAT J. (Dec. 6, 2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3261719/.  
32 CTR.S’ FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Public Health Preparedness: Strengthening CDC’s 
Emergency Response (Jan. 2009), https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/publications/2009/phprep_report_2009.pdf. 
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partners.33 The CDC Center for Global Health maintains regular relationships with the World 
Health Organization and numerous other national health departments and ministries.34   
Diagnosis 
Whether natural or intentional, it is imperative to accurately diagnose a pandemic’s cause 
in order to dispense effective countermeasures, to track its origin and spread, and to investigate 
potential perpetrators.  Diagnosis  of pathogens are coordinated by the CDC through the national 
Laboratory Response Network (“LRN”).35 The LRN is a nationwide network composed primarily 
of local, state, and federal government laboratories that provide confirmatory testing of potential 
bioterrorism pathogens in all 50 state public health labs and in additional locations.36 Consensus 
protocols for testing were developed by the CDC, the FBI, and the Association of Public Health 
Laboratories prior to the anthrax mailings of 2001.37   
In addition, the National Bioforensics Analysis Center (“NBFAC”), part of the National 
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center operated by the DHS in partnership with the 
FBI, is a central facility for analyzing biological samples in order to identify and attribute the use 
of biological weapons.38 NBFAC has implemented a multi-faceted research and development 
program, established a stand-alone Safety and Biosecurity Program, Quality/Accreditation 
Program, and received select agent-handling certification from the CDC for all laboratory staff 
and facilities.39 The NBFAC has also established a National Bioforensic Repository Collection 
with a comprehensive management plan and acquisition strategy to provide reference 
microbiological material against which suspect samples can be compared. 40  
 
 
                                                 
33 CTR.S’ FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC’s Global Health Partnerships, 
https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/partnerships.htm (last visited May 15, 2019).  
34 Mission/Function Statement, CTR. GLOB. HEALTH, http://www.cdc.gov/maso/pdf/CGHfs.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2019). 
35 CTR.S’ FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Partners and Other 
Related Sites, https://emergency.cdc.gov/lrn/partners.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).  
36 See Mary J. R. Gilchrist, A National Laboratory Network for Bioterrorism: Evolution from a Prototype 
Network of Laboratories Performing Routine Surveillance, 165 MIL. MED. 28 (2000), and B.A. Perkins et al., 
Public Health in the Time of Bioterrorism, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1015, 1015 (2002).  
37 HOLLY HARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31719, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM 
IN THE CONTEXT OF BIOTERRORISM (2003). 
38 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/labs/gc_1166211221830.shtm (last visited Jan. 17, 2019); See Vitko Jr., John, 
Director of Department of Homeland Security, National Biodefense Strategy, Congressional Testimony (July 
28, 2005).   
39 Joseph I. Lieberman et al., A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to 
Optimize Efforts, BIPARTISAN REP. OF THE BLUE RIBBON STUDY PANEL ON BIODEFENSE 4, 9 (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283295565_A_National_Blueprint_For_Biodefense_Leadership_An
d_Major_Reform_Needed_To_Optimize_Efforts.  
40 See Implementing the National Defense Strategy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Preventions of Nuclear 
Biological Attack of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. (2005). 
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II. Medical Countermeasures 
 
 Unlike most other disasters that require generic treatment of injuries due to blast and fire, 
treating victims of bio-attacks requires rapid and targeted application of specific medical 
countermeasures (“MCM”) such as vaccines and antidotes.41 Doing this effectively poses two 
challenges: 
1. Many MCMs need to be developed or improved, entailing substantial research and 
testing; 
2. MCMs need to be securely stockpiled, distributed to attack sites, and disseminated to 
victims under conditions of extreme stress. 
 MCM Development 
 Producing MCMs against bio-attacks brings several risks. Developing MCMs against 
many different pathogens is scientifically challenging; the market for useful products is extremely 
uncertain; and large research and development investments might never bring a fair return.42 
Project BioShield, the comprehensive system for MCM preparedness, is organized around three 
main aspects: 
1. Funding and procurement; 
2. Facilitation of R&D; and 
3. Facilitation of countermeasure use in an emergency.43 
A complex bureaucracy, administered by HHS through the office of the assistant secretary 
for preparedness and response  (“ASPR”) is responsible for incentivizing MCM preparedness.44   
The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (“NIAID”) have primary responsibility to see that promising drug candidates are awarded 
contracts through Project BioShield’s funds.45 The Institutes’ approach is known as the “push” 
                                                 
41 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., What are Medical Countermeasures?, https://www.fda.gov/emergency-
preparedness-and-response/about-mcmi/what-are-medical-countermeasures (last visited May 15, 2019).  
42 THERESA WIZEMANN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.S’ OF SCI.S’ ENG’G & MED., RAPID 
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE RESPONSE TO INFECTIOUS DISEASES: ENABLING SUSTAINABLE CAPABILITIES 
THROUGH ONGOING PUBLIC - AND PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS: WORKSHOP SUMMARY,  
(2016).  
43 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MCM-Related Counterterrorism Legislation,  
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-
framework/mcm-related-counterterrorism-legislation (last visited June 6, 2019). 
44 HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.phe.gov/about/aspr/pages/default.aspx.  
45 Barry Kellman & Zachary D. Clopton, A Global Architecture for Medical Counter-Measure Preparedness 
Against Bioviolence, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 550, 557 (2009); See also The NIH Almanac, NAT’L INST. OF 
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incentive because it tries to set in motion the wheels of research and expedite reviews of promising 
biodefense drugs through the application process.46   
Within ASPR, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
(“BARDA”) oversees and coordinates the research and acquisition of MCMs and is primarily 
responsible for facilitating communication between the federal government and the biomedical 
industry.47 For MCMs at an advanced level of development, the BioShield Special Reserve Fund 
enables BARDA to purchase and stockpile MCMs while simultaneously providing funding for 
their research and development, as well as providing the manufacturer with a guaranteed purchaser 
— the United States government.48 The Medical Countermeasure Development Fund, separate and 
in addition to the BioShield Special Reserve Fund, allows BARDA authorities to sponsor 
innovative research to improve MCMs.49   
When a promising MCM is developed, the Public Health Emergency Medical 
Countermeasures Enterprise (“PHEMCE”), overseen by BARDA as a multi-agency collaborative 
“entreprise”, determines its requirements and prioritizes development and acquisition programs.50  
Through the use of milestone contracts that allow companies to receive payments prior to final 
delivery of the goods, BARDA/PHEMCE can review the progress and determine whether the work 
is satisfactory so that promising drugs may be appropriately transitioned for additional funding.51 
The Department of Defense has complementary programs:  the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency’s Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative program seeks to develop broad-
spectrum defenses against bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fevers; the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency’s Accelerated Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals program is authorized 
                                                 
ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASE, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/nih-almanac/national-institute-
allergy-infectious-diseases-niaid (last updated Mar. 1, 2017).  
46 THERESA WIZEMANN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.S’, THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES ENTERPRISE: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE PRODUCTS FROM 
DISCOVERY THROUGH APPROVAL: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 39-40, 124, 142 (2010). 
47 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., BARDA Strategic Plan 2011-2016, BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RES. & 
DEV. AUTH. 4 (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.phe.gov/about/barda/Documents/barda-strategic-plan.pdf. 
48 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Project Bioshield Overview, 
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/cbrn/project-bioshield-overview.aspx (last visited May 15, 
2019).  
49 Id.  
50 Barry Kellman & Zachary D. Clopton, A Global Architecture for Medical Counter-Measure Preparedness 
Against Bioviolence, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 550, 556 (2009); See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., 
Implementation Plan for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats, HHS PUB. HEALTH EMER. 
MED. COUNTERMEASURE ENTER. 5-6 (Apr. 2007), 
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Documents/2007-phemce-implementation.pdf.  
51 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Project Bioshield Funding, 
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/cbrn/project-bioshield-overview/project-bioshield-
funding.aspx (last visited May 15, 2019). 
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to create a system for producing 3 million doses of vaccines or monoclonal antibodies within 
twelve (12) weeks.52 
While Project BioShield was initially funded with $5.6 billion, some of that funding has 
since been transferred to basic research and development of antiviral medications against the flu.53  
One reason for these transfers is that BioShield has had very limited success, generating only a 
handful of useful MCMs.54 Most experts give BioShield credit for alleviating some bureaucratic 
and financial impediments to developing MCMs and attribute its lack of success to the scientific 
complexity of discovering safe and effective medicines against threatening scourges.55 
New Vaccine Production Capacities 
 The government’s efforts to increase medical countermeasures’ production have had some 
success. A recently opened vaccine production facility in North Carolina is owned and managed 
by Novartis; the Department of Health and Human Services contributed 49 percent toward the 
facility’s total investment of nearly $1 billion.56 The facility produces vaccines using cultured 
canine kidney cells (instead of the traditional chicken eggs) to grow u vaccine—as much as 50 
million doses.57 Use of tissue culture in-stead of eggs reduces the danger of contamination and 
increases capacities for rapid mass production of vaccine.58 The new facility might reduce 
production times from five months to four, although there is dispute among experts if the new 
facility will in fact reduce production times by that much.59 There is also some disagreement 
about the impact of reduction times, with proponents emphasizing the ability to incorporate new 
                                                 
52 Defense Threat Reduction Agency: Chemical/Biological Technologies, DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY,  
http://www.dtra.mil/Research/Chemical-Biological-Technologies/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2019); Gigi Kwik  
Gronvall et al., Flexible Defenses Roundtable Meeting: Promoting the Strategic Innovation of Medical 
Countermeasures, 5 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 271, 274 (2007). 
53 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Project Bioshield Overview, 
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/cbrn/project-bioshield-overview/ (last updated Oct. 18, 2018); 
See also FRANK GROTTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41033, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: APPROPRIATIONS, 
ACQUISITIONS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2011). 
54 NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Q&A: Bioshield Program Successful After “Rocky Start,” HHS 
Preparedness Chief Says, https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/q-bioshield-program-successful-after-rocky-start-
hhs-preparedness-chief-says/ (last visited May 15, 2019). 
55 See Wil S. Hylton, How Ready are we for Bioterrorism?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterrorism.html. 
56 Robert Roos, Novartis Unveils US Cell-Based Flu Vaccine Plant, U. OF MINN. CTR. FOR  
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news 
perspective/2009/11/novartis-unveils-us-cell-based-flu-vaccine-plant. See also $486M Novartis Plant Funded,  
N.C. BIOTECHNOLOGY CTR. (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.ncbiotech.org/news/486m-novartis-plant- 
funded. 
57 Id. See also Karie Youngdahl, U.S. Cell Line Facility to Produce Pandemic Influenza Vaccine, THE HIST. OF  
VACCINES (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/blog/us-cell-line-facility-produce  
pandemic influenza-vaccine. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
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data about the disease in-to the vaccine.60 Other experts point out that, even at four months, a 
sudden and acute pandemic would already be in its second stage.61   
 
In addition, Medicago, recently opened a new vaccine production facility with a $21 million 
contract from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which makes a vaccine from 
virus-like particles of certain tobacco leaves.62 In this process, only 30 days are required to 
develop vaccines.63 This process may also have the advantage of reducing the cost and timing 
of vaccine production.64 In any event, the next stage in vaccine production involves the use of 
recombinant technology that is forecast to reduce production times to 12 weeks, though this 
capability is at least two years away.65   
 
Stockpile Planning, Distribution and Dispensation 
Surge capacity to produce MSMs does not currently exist when a bio-attack occurs.  
Therefore, MCMs must be produced in advance and stored in the Strategic National Stockpile 
(“SNS”) – a network of warehouses holding stores of medicines and equipment for distribution 
during emergencies.66 Locations and contents of specific countermeasures are kept secret for 
security reasons, but certainly include countermeasures for common bioterrorism threats such as 
vaccines for anthrax, smallpox and tularemia.67 Because MCMs must be maintained under strict 
temperature and other constraints, elaborate plans for the SNS have been developed by BARDA; 
the CDC manages the stockpile with support of BARDA, DHS and United States Department of 
Defense (“DoD”).68   
When a disease emergency is declared, the affected state’s governor must request delivery 
of MCMs, although in cases of national emergency the president can assume this responsibility.69  
CDC officials, in coordination with officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) as well as state and local officials, are authorized to evaluate the situation, determine the 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 See Mitchel L. Zoler, Flu Vaccine Facility May not Speed Production, SKIN & ALLERGY NEWS, Feb. 1,  
2012, at 34.  
62 Frank Vinluan, Medicago’s RTP Vaccine Facility Opens to Address Pandemics, MEDCITY NEWS (Nov. 14, 
2011), http://www.medcitynews.com/2011/11/medicagos-rtp-vaccine-facility-opens-to-address-pandemics/. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Plant-Derived Vaccines, BIOPHARMA DEALMAKERS (Jul. 20, 2018), 
https://biopharmadealmakers.nature.com/users/114926-medicago/posts/37798-plant-derived-vaccines. 
66 Barry Kellman & Zachary D. Clopton, A Global Architecture for Medical Counter-Measure Preparedness 
Against Bioviolence, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 550, 557 (2009).  
67 Anthrax, Smallpox, and Bioterrorism, THE VACCINE PAGE, http://vaccines.org/bioterrorism.html (last visited  
Feb. 11, 2019). 
68 James T. Need, Strategic National Stockpile Program: Implications for Military Medicine, 171 MIL. MED. 
698, 698 (2006). 
69Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile Assets: Version 11, CTR.S’ FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL 30, 72-73, https://www.orau.gov/sns/v11/ReceivingDistributingDispensing 
SNSAssets_V11.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
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most prudent action, and prioritize MCM dispensation.70 Under current plans, supplies from the 
SNS will be distributed to affected areas rapidly through push packages – government-owned 
caches of supplies and medications – within twelve (12) hours via either trucks or commercial 
cargo aircraft.71 Concurrently, the SNS Program will deploy its Stockpile Service Advance Group 
to coordinate with state and local officials so that the SNS assets can be efficiently received and 
distributed upon arrival at the site. 72  
There is ongoing debate about what is the best method of dispensing MCMs to the public.73  
Until relatively recently, plans have called from dispensation from central locations such as schools 
and community centers.74 This has the advantage of putting the MCMs into the hands of state and 
local health departments who have been trained on the reception, protection and dispensation of 
these supplies. There are, however, disadvantages, especially for people with challenged mobility 
or living far from urban centers. Moreover, central dispensation assumes that emergency 
responders are able to work and that there is a command and control system to effectively guide 
the process.  In a dire emergency, these assumptions might not be realistic.75  
For some MCMs – especially those that can be self-administered – an alternative to 
centralized dispensation is to get them to each household, typically through postal delivery.  This 
is far more convenient for house-bound citizens.  Moreover, inducing people to stay in their homes 
is important to reduce the spread of contagious disease; it obviously makes sense to avoid having 
them come to a central site to get their medicine. However, not all medication can be self-
administered, and effective household delivery does not ensure that the medication will be taken 
correctly. While an advance delivery of medicine and substantial information on proper use can 
alleviate some of these problems, certain medication has a short shelf life – delivering them in 
advance of an emergency might not be effective.  Altogether, officials are weighing many different 
options, none of which are perfect. 
                                                 
70 Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operations Plans 
Final - January 2017, FED. EMER. MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1511178017324-92a7a7f808b3f03e5fa2f8495bdfe335/BIA_Annex_Final_1-23-17_(508_Compliant_6-
28-17).pdf  (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
71 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Stockpile Responses, 
https://www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/responses.aspx (last visited May 15, 2019). 
72 2016 SNS Preparedness Course - SNS Overview, CTR.S’ FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/MCMTraining/SNS%20Prep%20Workbook%20for%20iPads_2016/Tab%201%20-
%20SNS_Overview_508%20(June%202015).pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
73 See How to Steward Medical Countermeasures and Public Trust in an Emergency: A Communication 
Casebook for FDA and its Public Health Partners, UPMC CTR. FOR HEALTH SEC. (Nov. 2016),  
http://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/events/2016%20FDA%20MCM/FDA_Casebook.pdf. 
74 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Strategic National Stockpile Distribution Planning: Selecting Facilities for 
Use as Dispensing Sites, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=765467 (last visited May 15, 2019). 
75 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.S’, Dispensing Medical Countermeasures for Public Health 
Emergencies: Workshop Summary, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK4111/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK4111.pdf (last visited June 6, 2019). 
 
 11 
III. Response and Restoration of Order  
 In many respects, responses to bio-attacks will be similar to any catastrophe. For example, 
as part of the normal National Response Framework, a governor can request the president to 
declare a state of emergency, which triggers FEMA’s authority under the Federal Emergency 
Response Plan, pursuant to the National Incident Management System, to provide technical and 
advisory assistance, funds and supplies.76 Yet, bio-attacks pose a unique threat that cannot be 
adequately addressed with normal emergency declaration processes because of the intensive need 
for specialized responses. In connection with bio-attacks, three aspects of consequence mitigation 
and order restoration deserve special attention.  
Use of Military Forces  
Generally, emergency responses do not involve the direct use of military forces because of 
restrictions imposed in the Posse Comitatus Act and the Stafford Act.77 National Guard units, 
however, may be used under the direction of their state’s governor because state militias are not 
generally bound by the Posse Comitatus Act.78 In response to bio-attacks, however, the U.S. 
attorney general may request assistance from the defense secretary because of the immediate need 
for specialized materials and training.79 The U.S. attorney general and the defense secretary must 
jointly determine that the biological weapon poses “a serious threat to the interest of the United 
States” according to the following three factors: 
1. Civilian expertise and capabilities cannot immediately counter the threat;  
2. The Defense Department's capabilities are necessary to counter the threat; and, 
3. Enforcement of the laws against weapons of mass destruction would be impaired if the 
Defense Department was not allowed to act.80  
The President also has the authority to use the military in order to alleviate the demands on 
local law enforcement in cases of a biological attack.81 
Public Health Mobilization 
 While the CDC has as an essential role in sharing information and providing both resources 
and expertise, the primary responsibility of a public health response will rest upon the public health 
departments of individual states. These departments, through the governor's authority, can 
                                                 
76 National Response Framework: List of Authorities and References, FED. EMER. MGMT.  
AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-authorities.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
77 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2017); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2017). 
78 JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42669, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND RELATED 
MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW 61-62 (2018). 
79 National Response Framework, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2019).  
80 10 U.S.C. § 382 (2017); 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2017); 18 U.S.C. § 2332(e) (2017). 
81 50 U.S.C. § 2316(d) (2017). 
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implement restrictions after an emergency is declared and conduct a large portion of laboratory 
testing. Moreover, states’ public health departments will likely coordinate mass casualty treatment 
and care. 
 Local public health departments have a critical role in public messaging, the operation of 
local clinics and information sharing among medical institutions. Public messaging will likely 
include information on best practices for limiting the spread of disease and other advisories. They 
may be the first to identify local public health impacts and have a responsibility to notify state and 
federal agencies.82 
 In the case of a biological attack, the traditional command and control under the National 
Incident Management System mentioned earlier will remain in place.83 Public health authorization 
is required for movement restrictions at the state level and for stockpile distribution at the federal 
level, and offers other protections.84 Because other agencies may not have the same specialized 
knowledge about protection from pathogens, treatment protocols or a technical understanding of 
disease spread, public health departments are likely to take the lead in response priorities and will 
likely encounter great deference. 
Restricting Movement 
 If a contagious agent is used in a bio-attack, the need to stanch the spread of disease may 
require a quarantine, restrictions on travel, curfews, the closing of borders, and cancellation of 
public gatherings.85 Most states authorize the governor to declare martial law during an emergency 
and  take personal property, subject to constitutional guarantees of fair compensation.86 Governors 
also have broad authority to reallocate the use of publicly owned facilities.87 It may be necessary 
for example, to convert public schools into sheltering, triage or command and control centers.  
Typically, there is a defined statutory period during which the governor may act in consultation 
with the state's public health department but without legislative approval.88   
                                                 
82 JO I. BOUFORD ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY, INST. OF MED. OF NAT’L 
ACAD.S’, 141 (2002).  
83Gregory Sunshine, Symposium: The Case for Streamlining Emergency Declaration Authorities and Adapting 
Legal Requirements to Ever-Changing Public Health Threats, 67 EMORY L.J. 397, 397 (2018).  
84 INST. OF MED. OF NAT’L ACAD.S’, The Future of the Public Health in the 21st Century, THE 
GOVERNMENTAL PUB. HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221231/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2019).  
85 Biological Index Annex, FED. EMER. MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_BiologicalIncidentAnnex.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
86 Constitutional Topic: Martial Law, THE U.S. CONST. ONLINE, 
https://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_mlaw.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).  
87 A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRAC.S’, 
http://www.npstc.org/documents/070314GovGuideHS.pdf (last visited Jan 15, 2019).  
88 INST. OF MED., Crisis Standards of Care: A Systems Framework for Catastrophic Disaster Response, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK201063 (last visited May 15, 2019). 
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Although federal authority requires more statutory certainty, various executive authorities 
have similarly broad powers in the correct conditions. The Surgeon General may, with the approval 
of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, make rules to prevent interstate 
and international transmission of disease including issuing orders to apprehend and detain those 
believed to be infected by disease.89 This authority does not extend to local quarantines, but the 
HHS secretary may cooperate and aid local officials in setting up their quarantines.90   
 Whenever a restriction such as a quarantine or evacuation is ordered, there will be some 
noncompliance. Judgments must be made to determine the amount of force allowed to enforce the 
restrictions: the force appropriate for a precautionary quarantine, as supposed to preventing the 
spread of a disease that could result in the deaths of hundreds of millions, will be dramatically 
different. With the societal stress, traditional crimes like looting and robbery will become more 
likely.  Responders who must use force are only held liable if their actions constituted unreasonably 
excessive force given what the responder was aware of at the time. 
IV. Conclusion 
Planning bio-attack responses must address the risks that an attacker can cause huge 
catastrophe using a variety of attack agents and release methods. Yet, bio-attacks have happened 
only once – the 2001 anthrax attacks.91 There is scant evidence on which to predict how a response 
to such potentially distinctive high-consequence events will unfold on a large scale. Moreover, the 
maze of bureaucratic responsibility for responding to bio-attacks means that no centralized 
authority (short of the president) will exercise over-arching command and control.  Indeed, federal 
responsibilities are spread among various offices in the DHS and HHS, with support from the 
attorney general, surgeon general, and Defense Department. 92  However, the response is not 
entirely federal and local officials also have critical roles in responses.  On top of all this is the 
likely unprecedented panic that a bio-attack will provoke. All these factors – lack of experience, 
mass consequences and panic, variable conditions and attack modes, and overlapping 
responsibilities -- will make it difficult to sort out the facts of a bio-attack. The key to success is 
preparation.   
  
                                                 
89 42 U.S.C. § 264 et seq. (2017). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 243 (2017). 
91 Supra note 69. 
92 ASS’N OF ST. & TERR. HEALTH OFFICIALS, Strategic National Stockpile, 
http://www.astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-Emergency-Law/Emergency-Use-Authorization-
Toolkit/Strategic-National-Stockpile-Fact-Sheet/ (last visited May 15, 2019). 
 
